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Abstract
We study the conditions under which the iterated elimination of strictly domi-
nated strategies is order independent and we identify a class of discontinuous
games for which order does not matter. In this way, we answer the open
problem raised by M. Dufwenberg and M. Stegeman (2002) and generalize
their main results. We also establish new theorems concerning the existence
and uniqueness of the maximal game reduction when the pure strategies are
dominated by mixed strategies.
Keywords: Game theory, strict dominance, iterated elimination, order
independence, maximal reduction.
1. Introduction
The question raised by Pearce (1984), concerning the rationalizable strate-
gic behaviour of the players in noncooperative strategic situations was fol-
lowed by a great amount of literature. It seemed to attract the interest of
researchers from Game theory. The first step of research in this area was
made by Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984), who defined the rationalizable
strategies of a strategic game by using iterative processes of elimination of
dominated strategies that were considered ’undesirable’.
This procedure led to the issue of order independence, which was studied
by many authors. They searched for classes of games and defined domi-
nance relations under which the result of the iterative process of removal of
dominated strategies does not depend on the order of removal.
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Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel (1990) provided conditions (including strict dom-
inance) which guarantee the uniqueness of the reduced games. Marx and
Swinkels (1997) defined nice weak dominance, proved that under this or-
der relation, order does not matter. The main result of Dufwenberg and
Stegeman (2002) concerns a class of games for which a unique and nonempty
maximal reduction exists. The properties satisfied by games for which the
iterated elimination for strictly dominated strategies (IESDS) preserves the
set of Nash equilibria are the compactness of the strategy spaces and the
continuity of payoff functions. The authors also proved that if, in addition,
the payoff functions are upper semicontinuous in own strategies, then the or-
der does not matter. Chen, Long and Luo (2007) provided a new definition
of IESDS that proved to be suitable for all types of games and also order-
independent. Apt’s approach (2007) uses operators on complete latice and
their transfinite iterations. The monotonicity of the operators assures the
order independence of iterated eliminations. Apt’s paper (2007) provides an
analysis of different ways of iterated eliminations of strategies. The notions
of dominance and rationalizability are involved by other two strategy elimi-
nation procedures studied by Apt (2005). In order to study the problem of
order independence for rationalizability, the author considers three reduction
relations on games and belief structures.
In this paper, we identify a class of discontinuous games for which or-
der independence holds, generalizing the main results of Dufwenberg and
Stegeman (2002). The payoff functions are transfer weakly upper continuous
in the sense of Tian and JZhou (1995). These authors defined the transfer
upper continuity and proved generalizations of Weierstrass and of the max-
imum theorem. We also establish results for game reductions in which the
pure strategies are dominated by mixed strategies. We use some notions of
measurability and especially some results of Robson (1990).
The paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 contains prelimi-
naries and notations. Generalizations of Dufwenberg-Stegeman Lemma are
presented in Section 3. The mixed strategy case is treated in Section 4. The
concluding remarks follow at the end.
2. Preliminaries
Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002) concluded that it remained an open
problem to identify classes of games for which order independence holds,
outside of the compact and continuous class.
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We are searching to solve this problem. In order to reach this aim, we
first introduce the notions of games, parings, dominance and game reduc-
tion, following that, in the next subsection, we discuss the transfer upper
continuity, a concept due to Tian and Zhou, which characterizes the payoff
functions of a class of games which generalizes than that one of Dufwenberg
and Stegeman. In section 3, we will prove that, in this case the iterated
elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS) also produces a unique
maximal reduction.
2.1. Games, Parings, Dominance and Reduction
In the paper called ”Equilibrium points in n-person games” (1950), Nash
describes without formalizing, the concepts of the n-person game and the
equilibrium of the attached game. He defines the n-person game, where
each player has a finite number of strategies and each n-tuple of strategies
corresponding to a given set of players wins. Any n-tuple of strategies can
be regarded as a point in the product space of sets of players’ strategies.
A point of equilibrium is an n-tuple of strategies such that every player’s
strategy brings the maximum payout for that player, against n-1 strategies
of the other ones.
We give the formal definition of an n-person game below.
Definition 1. The normal form of an n-person game is G = (I, (Gi)i∈I , (ri)i∈I),
where, for each i ∈ I = {1, 2, ..., n}, Gi is a non-empty set (the set of indi-
vidual strategies of player i) and ri is the preference relation on
∏
i∈I Gi of
player i.
The individual preferences ri are often represented by utility functions, i.e.
for each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} there exists a real valued function ui :
∏
i∈I Gi → R
(called the utility function of i), such that xriy ⇔ ui(x) ≥ ui(y), ∀x, y ∈∏
i∈I Gi.
Then the normal form of n-person game is (I, (Gi)i∈I , (ui)i∈I).
Notation. Denote x−i=(x1, ..., xi−1, xi+1, ..., xn) and G−i =
∏
j∈I\{i}Gj .
Definition 2. The Nash equilibrium for the game (I, (Gi)i∈I , (ui)i∈I) is a
point x∗ ∈
∏
i∈I Gi which satisfies for each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} : ui(x
∗) ≥
ui(x
∗
−i, xi) for each xi ∈ Gi.
Further we will assume that for each i ∈ I, the set Gi is a Hausdorff
topological space and
∏
i∈I Gi is endowed with the product topology.
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Definition 3. The game G is called
i) compact if Gi is compact for each i ∈ I;
ii) own-uppersemicontinuous if ui(·, s−i) is upper semicontinuous for each
i ∈ I and for each s−i ∈ G−i;
iii) continuous if ui is continuous for each i ∈ I.
Definition 4. (Dufwenberg and Stegeman, 2002). A paring of G is a triple
H = (I, (Hi)i∈I , (u
′
i)i∈I), where Hi ⊆ Gi and u
′
i = ui|
∏
i∈I Hi
.
A pairing is nonempty if Hi 6= ∅ for each i ∈ I.
Definition 5. Given a pairing H of G, the strict dominance relation ≻H on
Gi can be defined:
for x, y ∈ Gi, y ≻H x if H−i 6= ∅ and ui(y, s−i) > ui(x, s−i) for each
s−i ∈ H−i.
Remark 1. ≻H is transitive.
Let us consider parings G,H with the property that Hi ⊆ Gi for each
i ∈ I.We give here the definition of game reduction used by Dufwenberg and
Stegeman (2002), in order to generalize their main results, following that, in
the next section we will introduce other types of reduction and discuss the
relationships amongst them.
Definition 6. i) G → H is called a reduction if for each x ∈ Gi\Hi, there
exists y ∈ Gi such that y ≻G x.
ii) the reduction G→ H is called fast if y ≻G x for some x, y ∈ Gi implies
x /∈ Hi.
iii) the reduction G→∗ H is defined by the existence of (finite or count-
able infinite) sequence of parings At of G, t = 0, 1, 2..., such that A0 = G,
At → At+1 for each t ≥ 0 and Hi = ∩tAti for each i ∈ I;
iv)H is said to be a maximal (→∗)-reduction of G if G→∗ H andH → H ′
only for H = H ′.
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2.2. Transfer upper continuity
Tian and Zhou (1995)relaxed the continuity assumptions on functions
and correspondences which can be used in some economic models. Their work
was motivated by questions concerning the minimal conditions under which a
function reaches its maximum on a compact set or the set of maximum points
of a function defined on a compact set is non-empty and compact. Tian and
Zhou introduced the transfer continuities and generalized the Weierstrass
Theorem by giving a necessary and sufficient condition for a function f to
reach its maximum on a compact set.
We are providing here the concepts of transfer upper semicontinuity and
transfer weakly upper continuity for functions, the concept of transfer closed-
valuedness for correspondences and some of their properties.
Let X, Y be subsets of topological spaces.
Definition 7. A function f : X → R is said to be upper semicontinuous on
X if {x ∈ X : f(x) ≥ r} is closed in X for all r ∈ R.
Definition 8. (Tian and Zhou, 1995) A function f : X → R ∪ {−∞} is
said to be transfer upper continuous on X if for points x, y ∈ X, f(y) < f(x)
implies that there exists a point x′ ∈ X and a neighborhood N (y) of y such
that f(z) < f(x′) for all z ∈ N (y).
Definition 9. (Tian and Zhou, 1995) A correspondence F : X → 2Y is said
to be transfer closed-valued on X if for every x ∈ X, y /∈ F (x) implies that
there exists x′ ∈ X such that y /∈clF (x′).
Remark 2. (Tian and Zhou, 1995) It is clear that, for any function f :
X → R ∪ {−∞}, the correspondence F : X → 2X defined by F (x) = {y ∈
X : f(y) ≥ f(x)} for all x ∈ X is transfer closed-valued on X if and only if
f is transfer upper continuous on X.
The next lemma characterizes the correspondences which have transfer
closed-values.
Lemma 1. (Tian and Zhou, 1995) Let X and Y be two topological spaces,
and let F : X → 2Y be a correspondence. Then, ∩x∈XclF (x) = ∩x∈XF (x) if
and only if F is transfer closed-valued on X.
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The next property is a necessary condition for a function to have a max-
imum on a choice set G.
Definition 10. (Tian and Zhou, 1995) A function f : X → R ∪ {−∞} is
said to be transfer weakly upper continuous on X if, for points x, y ∈ X,
f(y) < f(x) implies that there exists a point x′ ∈ X and a neighbourhood
N (y) of y, such that f(z) ≤ f(x′) for all z ∈ N (y).
Theorem 1 generalizes the Weierstrass theorem.
Theorem 2. (Tian and Zhou, 1995) Let X be a compact subset of a topo-
logical space and let f : X → R ∪ {−∞} be a function. Then f reaches its
maximum on X if and only if f is transfer weakly upper continuous on X.
Morgan and Scalzo (2007) defined the upper pseudocontinuity and proved
the existence of Nash equilibrium for economic models with payoff functions
having this property.
Definition 11. (Morgan and Scalzo, 2007) Let X be a topological space and
f : X → R. f is said to be upper pseudocontinuous at z0 ∈ X such that
f(z0) < f(z), we have lim supy→z0 f(y) < f(z0).
Remark 3. The class of upper pseudocontinuous functions is strictly in-
cluded in the class of transfer upper continuous functions introduced by Tian
and Zhou.
3. Generalizations of Dufwenberg-Stegeman Lemma
The following lemma is due to Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002).
Lemma 3. If G →∗ H for some compact and own-uppersemicontinuous
game G, and y ≻H x for some x, y ∈ Gi and i ∈ I, then there exists z∗ ∈ Hi
such that z ⊁H z
∗ ≻H x for each z ∈ Gi.
Let G→ H be a game reduction. We introduce the following definition.
Definition 12. ≻H has property K if for each i ∈ I and for each y ∈ Gi,
there exists z0 ∈ Gi with z0 H y such that {z ∈ Gi : z H z0} is compact.
6
Lemma 3 generalizes the Dufwenberg-Stegeman Lemma by relaxing the
continuity assumption on the payoff functions of the game. We use the notion
of transfer upper continuity due to Tian and Zhou (1995). Note that G may
not be compact.
Before stating the lemma, we define two types of discontinuous games.
Definition 13. The game G is called
i) own transfer upper continuous if ui(·, s−i) is transfer upper continuous
for each i ∈ I and for each s−i ∈ G−i;
ii) own transfer weakly upper continuous if ui(·, s−i) is transfer weakly
upper continuous for each i ∈ I and for each s−i ∈ G−i;
Lemma 4. Let us assume that G →∗ H for an own-transfer weakly upper
continuous game G and ≻H has property K. If y ≻H x for some x, y ∈ Gi
and i ∈ I, then there exists z∗ ∈ Hi such that z ⊁H z∗ ≻H z for each z ∈ Gi.
Proof. Since G →∗ H, there exists a sequence of parings At, t = 0, 1, 2...
such that A0 = G, At → At+1 ∀t ≥ 0 and Hi = ∩tAti, ∀i ∈ I.
Let Z := {z ∈ Gi : ui(z, s−i) ≥ ui(y, s−i) ∀s−i ∈ H−i}. According to
property K of ≻H , it follows that there exists z0 ∈ Gi such that z0 H y and
U := {z ∈ Gi : z H z0} is compact. Since y ≻H x, we have that H−i 6= ∅.
Let us define f : U → R by f(z) = ui(z, s∗−i), where s
∗
−i ∈ H−i is fixed.
Since f is transfer weakly upper continuous on U, f reaches its maximum
in z∗ ∈ U ⊂ Z. We note that z∗ ∈ Z and y ≻H x imply z∗ ≻H x. If z ≻H z∗
for some z ∈ Gi, then ui(z, s−i) > ui(z∗, s−i) ∀s−i ∈ H−i, implying that
z ∈ U and f(z) > f(z∗), contradiction. Therefore, z ⊁H z∗ ∀z ∈ Gi, so
that z ⊁At z
∗ ∀z ∈ Gi ∀t ≥ 0 implying that z∗ ∈ Ati ∀t ≥ 0. It follows that
z∗ ∈ Hi.
Example 1. Let I = {1, 2}, G1 = G2 = [0, 2], ui : Gi ×Gj → R,
ui(x, y) =


1 if x = 0;
2 if x ∈ (0, 1);
x+ 1 if x ∈ [1, 2].
Let H = (H1, H2) H1 = H2 = [0, 1].
We notice that, for each y ∈ G2, ui(., y) is transfer weakly upper contin-
uous on [0,2] and ui(., y) is not upper semicontinuous at x = 0.
We prove that ≻H has property K :
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If y = 0, there exists z0 = 0 such that U(0) = {z ∈ [0, 2] : u1(z, s) ≥
u1(0, s) for each s ∈ H2} = [0, 2] is a compact set.
If y ∈ (0, 1), there exists z0 =
3
2
such that U(3
2
) = {z ∈ [0, 2] : u1(z, s) ≥
u1(
3
2
, s) for each s ∈ H2} = [
3
2
, 1] is a compact set.
If y ∈ [1, 2], there exists z0 = y such that U(z0) = {z ∈ [0, 2] : u1(z, s) ≥
u1(z0, s) for each s ∈ H2} = [y, 2] is a compact set.
We have that for any x, y ∈ [0, 2] such that y ≻H x, there exists z∗ ∈ [0, 2]
such that z∗ ≻H x and z ⊁H z
∗ ≻ x for each z ∈ Hi.
If H = G, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 5. Let assume that G is an own-transfer weakly upper continuous
game G and ≻G has property K. If y ≻G x for some x, y ∈ Gi and i ∈ I,
then there exists z∗ ∈ Gi such that z ⊁G z∗ ≻G z for each z ∈ Gi.
If in the last corollary, the game G is transfer upper semicontinuous and
compact, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 6. Let assume that G is a compact, own transfer upper semicon-
tinuous game G. If y ≻G x for some x, y ∈ Gi and i ∈ I, then there exists
z∗ ∈ Gi such that z ⊁G z∗ ≻G z for each z ∈ Gi.
In order to obtain other generalization of Dufwenberg-Stegeman Lemma
(2002), we further define the property M for a function u.
Definition 14. Let X be a subset of a topological space. The function u :
X → R ∪ {−∞} has the property M on X if for each y ∈ X, x ∈cl{z ∈ X :
u(z) ≥ u(y)}\{z ∈ X : u(z) ≥ u(y)}, implies there exists x′ ∈ X such that
u(x′) > u(x).
We provide an example of transfer weakly upper continuous function
which verifies the property M.
Example 2. u : [0, 1]→ R, u(x) =
{
1, if x is a rational number,
0, otherwise.
First, let y ∈ Q. For example, let y = 1
2
, u(y) = 1. Let U = {z ∈ [0, 1] :
u(z) ≥ 1} = [0, 1] ∩ Q. The set clU = [0, 1]. If x ∈clU\U = [0, 1] ∩ (R\Q),
u(x) = 0 and there exists x′ ∈ [0, 1] such that u(x′) = 1 > u(x) = 0.
The property M is also verified for y ∈ R\Q.
Lemma 4 also generalizes Dufwenberg-Stegeman Lemma (2002).
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Lemma 7. Let us assume that G →∗ H for a compact and own-transfer
weakly upper continuous game G and for each i ∈ I and for each s−i ∈ H−i,
the function ui(·, s−i) has property M. If y ≻H x for some x, y ∈ Gi and
i ∈ I, then there exists z∗ ∈ Hi such that z ⊁H z∗ ≻H z for each z ∈ Gi.
Proof. Since G →∗ H, there exists a sequence of parings At, t = 0, 1, 2...
such that A0 = G, At → At+1 ∀t ≥ 0 and Hi = ∩tA
t
i, ∀i ∈ I.
Since y ≻H x, we have that H−i 6= ∅. For each s−i ∈ H−i, let Z(s−i) :=
{z ∈ Gi : ui(z, s−i) ≥ ui(y, s−i)} and Z := ∩s−i∈H−iclZ(s−i). The set Z is
compact. Let us define f : Z → R by f(z) = ui(z, s∗−i), where s
∗
−i ∈ H−i is
fixed.
Since f is transfer weakly upper continuous on Z, f attains its maximum
in z∗ ∈ Z. Each ui has property M and then we conclude that for each
s−i ∈ H−i, z∗ ∈ Z(s−i). We have y ≻H x and this fact implies z∗ ≻H x. If
z ≻H z∗ for some z ∈ Gi, then ui(z, s−i) > ui(z∗, s−i) ∀s−i ∈ H−i, implying
that z ∈ Z and f(z) > f(z∗), contradiction. Therefore, z ⊁H z∗ ∀z ∈ Gi,
so that z ⊁At z
∗ ∀z ∈ Gi ∀t ≥ 0 implying z∗ ∈ Ati ∀t ≥ 0. It follows that
z∗ ∈ Hi.
If H = G, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 8. Let us assume that G is a compact and own-transfer weakly
upper continuous game G and for each i ∈ I and for each s−i ∈ G−i, the
function ui(·, s−i) has property M. If y ≻G x for some x, y ∈ Gi and i ∈ I,
then there exists z∗ ∈ Gi such that z ⊁G z
∗ ≻G z for each z ∈ Gi.
The next theorem is Theorem 1 in Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002).
It is the main result concerning the existence and uniqueness of nonempty
maximal reductions of compact and continuous games.
Theorem 9. a) If a game G is compact and own-uppersemicontinuous, then
any nonempty maximal (→∗) reduction of G is the unique maximal (→∗)
reduction of G.
b) If a game G is compact and continuous, then G has a unique maximal
(→∗) reduction M ; furthermore, M is nonempty, compact and continuous.
We generalize the theorem above by weakening the continuity conditions
on payoff functions which describe the game model. In order to do this, we
introduce the following definition.
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Definition 15. The reduction G→∗∗ H is defined by the existence of (finite
or countable infinite) sequence of parings At of G, t = 0, 1, 2..., such that
A0 = G, At → At+1 for each t ≥ 0 and Hi = ∩tAti for each i ∈ I and by the
consistency with the continuity of the utility functions, which means that for
each i ∈ I, the payoff function ui maintains the same continuity property on
each set
∏
i∈I A
t
i, t = 0, 1, 2..., as it has on
∏
i∈I Gi.
Definition 16. The function ui : G → R has the intersection property with
respect to the ith variable if there exists S−i ⊂ G−i such that Z−i(x) = S−i
for each x ∈ Gi and Zi(x) = ∩s−i∈S−iFi(x, s−i), where Z(x) = {(si, s−i) ∈ G :
ui(x, s−i) ≤ ui(si, s−i)}, Zi(x) =priZ(x), Z−i(x) =pr−iZ(x) and Fi(x, s−i) =
{si ∈ Gi : ui(x, s−i) ≤ ui(si, s−i)}.
Example 3. Let G = [0, 1]× [0, 1] and let u1 : G→ R be defined by
u1(x, y) =
{
1 + x+ y if x ∈ Q;
x if x ∈ R\Q.
For each y ∈ [0, 1], the function u1(·, y) is not upper semicontinuous, but
it is transfer upper continuous since, for a neighborhood N ⊂ [0, 1], we may
choose any x′ rational such that sup{x : x ∈ N} < x′ ≤ 1.
We prove that u1 fulfills the intersection property with respect to x.
We have that Z(x) =
{
{[x, 1] ∩Q} × [0, 1] if x ∈ Q;
{[0, 1] ∩Q} × [0, 1] ∪ {[x, 1] ∩ R\Q} × [0, 1] if x ∈ R\Q,
Z1(x) =
{
[x, 1] ∩Q if x ∈ Q;
{[0, x] ∩Q} ∪ [x, 1] if x ∈ R\Q
, Z2(x) = [0, 1] = G2 and
F1(x, s2) =
{
[x, 1] ∩Q if x ∈ Q;
{[0, x] ∩Q} ∪ [x, 1] ∩ R\Q if x ∈ R\Q.
It follows that Z1(x) = ∩s2∈G2F1(x, s2).
Definition 17. The game G has the intersection property if ui : G→ R has
the intersection property with respect to the ith variable for each i ∈ I.
Theorem 10. a) Let G be an own-transfer weakly upper continuous game
which has also the intersection property, such that ≻H has property K for
every G → H. Then, any nonempty maximal reduction G →∗∗ M is the
unique maximal reduction.
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b) If G is a compact, own-transfer upper continuous game such that ≻H
has property K for every G → H, then it has a nonempty compact own-
transfer upper semicontinuous maximal (→∗∗) reduction M and this reduc-
tion is unique.
Proof. a) The proof follows the same line as Theorem 1 of Dufwenberg
and Stegeman (2002).
b) We prove that if G→ H fast, then H is compact and nonempty. Since
y ≻G x for some x, y ∈ Gi, then Hi 6= ∅.
We will show further that Hi is compact. Let Z(x) = {(si, s−i) ∈ G :
ui(x, s−i) ≤ ui(si, s−i)}, Zi(x) =priZ(x) and Z−i(x) =pr−iZ(x) = S−i for
each x ∈ S−i. Since x ∈ Zi(x), it follows that Zi(x) 6= ∅. We first prove that
Hi = ∩x∈HiZi(x). Let us choose an arbitrary element z of Gi. If z /∈ Zi(x),
for each x ∈ Hi, then ui(x, s−i) > ui(z, s−i) for each s−i ∈ G−i. It follows
that x ≻H z and therefore, z /∈ Hi. This fact implies that Hi ⊆ ∩x∈HiZi(x). If
z /∈ Hi, there exists x ∈ Gi such that x ≻G z and according to Corrolary 2, it
follows that there exists x∗ ∈ Gi such that x∗ ≻G z. The last assertion implies
that z /∈ Zi(x∗) and therefore, z /∈ ∩x∈HiZi(x). We have ∩x∈HiZi(x) ⊆ Hi
and the equality Hi = ∩x∈HiZi(x) follows from the above assertions.
Now let us define Fi(x, s−i) = {si ∈ Gi : ui(x, s−i) ≤ ui(si, s−i)} and
then, Zi(x) = ∩s−i∈S−iFi(x, s−i). Since we have the reduction G →
∗∗ H,
the function ui(., s−i) is transfer upper continuous on Hi for s−i fixed, and,
according to Lemma 1, it follows that ∩x∈HiFi(x, s−i) = ∩x∈HiclFi(x, s−i).
Therefore, Hi = ∩x∈HiZi(x) = ∩x∈Hi ∩s−i∈S−i Fi(x, s−i) =
∩s−i∈S−i ∩x∈Hi Fi(x, s−i) = ∩s−i∈S−i∩x∈HiclFi(x, s−i), then Hi is a closed
set. Hi is closed, Hi ⊂ Gi, Gi is compact, then Hi is compact.
We consider C(t) t = 0, 1, ... the unique sequence of subgames of G such
that C(0) = G and C(t) → C(t + 1) is fast for each t ≥ 0. The set C(t) is
compact and nonempty for each t ≥ 0. The gameMi = ∩t≥0C(t) is compact,
transfer upper semicontinuous and nonempty. We show thatM is a maximal
(→∗∗)-reduction of G. Consider any player i and x, y ∈ Mi. Let X(t) :=
{s−i ∈ (C(t))−i : ui(y, s−i) ≤ ui(x, s−i). We claim that X(t) 6= ∅. If not, for
each s−i ∈ (C(t))−i, it follows that ui(y, s−i) > ui(x, s−i), so that y ≻C(t) x,
contradicting x ∈Mi. (C(t))−i is compact and ∩t≥0(C(t))−i is nonempty and
compact.
Let X ′ = {s−i ∈ ∩t≥0(C(t))−i : ui(y, s−i) ≤ ui(x, s−i)}
= {s−i ∈M−i : ui(y, s−i) ≤ ui(x, s−i)}.
Since M−i 6= ∅, it follows that X ′ 6= ∅ and therefore y ⊁M x and M is
maximal.
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Corollary 11. The results also mainntain for the class of upper pseudocon-
tinuous games.
By applying Lemma 4 , we obtain the following result.
Theorem 12. a) Let G be a compact and own-transfer weakly upper con-
tinuous game which has also the intersection property, such that for each
i ∈ I, the payoff function ui has property M. Then, any nonempty maximal
reduction G→∗∗ M is the unique maximal reduction.
b) If G is a compact, own-transfer upper continuous game such that for
each i ∈ I, the payoff function ui has property M , then it has a nonempty
compact own-transfer upper semicontinuous maximal (→∗∗) reduction M.
The reduction M is unique.
4. The Mixed Strategies Case
In Subsection 6.2 Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002) approached the issue
of mixed strategy dominance. They distinguished between the case in which
a pure strategy is dominated by a pure strategy and the case in which it is
domintated by a mixed strategy. The main result is obtained by applying
Theorem 1 to the mixed extensions of finite games. We will extend Dufwen-
berg and Stegeman’s research by taking into consideration several types of
dominance relations and game reductions.
For the reader’s convenience, we review here a few basic notions and nota-
tions which deal with measurability. For an overview, please see Parthasarathy
(2005).
4.1. Measurable spaces
Suppose that (G,G) is a measurable space and H ∈ G. Let us define
H = {H ∩ A : A ∈ G}. Then H is a σ−algebra of subsets of H and (H,H)
is a measurable space.
Definition 18. Given a measurable space (G,G) and x ∈ G, define the prob-
ability measure δx as
δx(H) =
{
1 if x ∈ H ;
0 if x /∈ H
for each H ∈ G.
δx is called the Dirac measure with unit mass at x.
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Theorem 13. Let X be a finite set with a discrete σ−algebra. Then, every
probability µ on this measurable space can be unique represented in the form
µ =
∑
x∈X cxδx, where cx ∈ [0, 1] ∀x ∈ X,
∑
x∈X cx = 1, thus µ(E) =∑
x∈E cx for all E ⊂ X.
Notation If (G,G) is a measurable space, we will denote by ∆(G) the set
of probability measures defined on G.
Let I = {1, 2, ..., n} and the game G = (Gi, ui)i∈I .
Assume that for each i ∈ I, Gi is a compact subset in a metric space X
and ui(., s−i) : Gi → R is upper semicontinuous for each s−i ∈ Gi.
Each ui is measurable since it is upper semicontinuous and since it is also
bounded, it is integrable. We denote by ∆(Gi) the set of probability measure
on the set of Borel sets on Gi.∆(Gi) will be equipped with the weak topology.
Theorem 14. Let G be a subset of a metric space. Then, G is compact if
and only if ∆(G) is compact.
A mixed strategy for player i is an element µi ∈ ∆(Gi).
Definition 19. (Billingsley (1968), p 7). Suppose {µn}n≥1, µn belong to
∆(G), the set of probability measures on the Borel sets of some compact met-
ric space G. Then ”µn weakly converges to µ”, written µn
w
→ µ iff
∫
fdµn →∫
fdµ for all f : G → R, f continuous. This topology is consistent with
Prohorov metric.
Lemma 15. (Robson 1990). Consider u : G→ R un upper semicontinuous
function, where G is a compact metric space. It follows that
∫
udµ is upper
semicontinuous in µ : lim supn
∫
udµn ≤
∫
udµ if (µn)n, µ ∈ ∆(G), the set of
probability measures on Borel sets of G and µn
w
→ µ.
Corollary 16. If for the game G, ui(., s
∗
−i) : Gi → R is upper semicon-
tinuous, then the function Vi(., s
∗
−i) : ∆(Gi) → R, defined by Vi(µi, s
∗
−i) =∫
ui(µi, s
∗
−i)dµi(si) is upper semicontinuous.
We define the following extension of ≻H :
Definition 20. Let G → H, G = (Gi, ui)i∈I , I finite, Gi is a subset of a
metric space X for each i ∈ I. Let ∆(Gi) be the set of probability measures
on Borel sets of Gi and Vi(., s−i) : ∆(Gi) → R, defined by Vi(µi, s−i) =∫
ui(µi, s−i)dµi(si) for each s−i fixed. Given x ∈ Gi and µi ∈ ∆(Gi), we say
that µi ≻H x if H−i 6= ∅ and Vi(µi, s−i) > ui(x, s−i) for each s−i ∈ H−i.
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Lemma 17. If G →∗ H for some compact and own-upper semicontinuous
game G and y ≻H x for some x, y ∈ Gi and i ∈ I, then, there exists z∗ ∈ Hi
such that µ ⊁H z
∗ ≻H x for each µ ∈ ∆(Gi).
Proof. The assumptions of Dufwenberg-Stegeman Lemma are fulfilled.
Then there exists z∗ ∈ Hi such that z ⊁H z∗ ≻H x for each z ∈ Gi.We prove
that, in addition, µ ⊁H z
∗ for each µ ∈ ∆(Gi).
If µ ≻H z∗ for some µ ∈ ∆(Gi), then
∫
ui(si, s−i)dµi(si) > ui(z
∗, s−i) for
each s−i ∈ H−i, implying
∫
ui(si, s
∗
−i)dµi(si) > ui(z
∗, s∗−i) for some s
∗
−i fixed
in H−i..........(1)
We note that z∗ = argmaxsi∈Z ui(si, s
∗
−i) = argmaxsi∈Gi ui(si, s
∗
−i), where
Z = {z ∈ Gi : ui(z, s−i) ≥ ui(y, s−i) ∀s−i ∈ H−i}. It follows that ui(z∗, s∗−i) ≥
ui(si, s
∗
−i) for each s−i ∈ G−i, and therefore, ui(z
∗, s∗−i) ≥
∫
ui(si, s
∗
−i)dµi(si),
relation which contradicts (1). Therefore, µ ⊁H z
∗ for each µ ∈ ∆(Gi).
4.2. Types of dominance relations and reductions
Let I be a finite set. For each i ∈ I, let (Gi,Gi) be a measurable space,
Hi ∈ Gi, Hi = {Hi∩A : A ∈ Gi} and ui :
∏
i∈I Gi → R be a ⊗Gi−measurable
and bounded. Let G =
∏
i∈I Gi.
Definition 21. We define the followings types of dominance relations.
i) µ ≻∆(H) m for µ,m ∈ ∆(Gi) if
∫
Gi×H−i
ui(si, s−i)dµ1×...×dµi−1×dµ×
dµi+1× ...×dµn >
∫
Gi×H−i
ui(si, s−i)dµ1× ...×dµi−1×dm×dµi+1× ...×dµn,
∀ µ1 × ...× µi−1 × µi+1 × ...× µn ∈ ∆(H−i).
ii) µ ≻H m for µ,m ∈ ∆(Gi) if
∫
Gi
ui(si, s−i)dµ >
∫
Gi
ui(si, s−i)dm
∀s−i ∈ H−i.
iii) µ ≻H x for µ ∈ ∆(Gi) and x ∈ Gi if µ ≻H δx, which is equivalent
with
∫
Gi
ui(si, s−i)dµ > ui(x, s−i) ∀s−i ∈ H−i.
We obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 18. With the notations above, we have the following relations
amongst the former types of dominance:
i) µ ≻∆(H) m for µ,m ∈ ∆(Gi)⇒ µ ≻H m
To prove this fact, we take µ = δsj for j 6= i, sj ∈ Hj .
ii) µ ≻H m for µ,m ∈ ∆(Gi)⇒ µ ≻H x⇔ µ ≻H δx, x ∈ Gi.
Since δx ∈ ∆(Gi) for x ∈ Gi, ii) can be easily checked.
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Let us consider parings G,H with the property that Hi ⊆ Gi for each
i ∈ I. In addition to the game reduction used by Dufwenberg and Stegeman
(2002), we present the following ones.
Definition 22. i) (Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel 1990) G ⇒ H if, for each x ∈
Gi\Hi, there exists y ∈ Hi such that y ≻H x.
ii) G 7→ H if, for each x ∈ Gi\Hi, there exists µ ∈ ∆(Gi) such that
µ ≻H x.
iii) G ⇒ H if, for each x ∈ Gi\Hi, there exists µ ∈ ∆(Hi) such that
µ ≻H x.
iv) ∆(G) →֒ ∆(H) if, for each m ∈ ∆(Gi)\∆(Hi), there exists µ ∈ ∆(Gi)
such that y ≻H m.
v) ∆(G)⇛ ∆(H) if, for each m ∈ ∆(Gi)\∆(Hi), there exists µ ∈ ∆(Hi)
such that y ≻H m.
We will need the following theorem.
Theorem 19. There are the following relations amongst the former types of
reductions.
i) (G⇒ H) =⇒ (G→ H)
(G⇒ H) =⇒ (G 7→ H)
(∆(G)⇛ ∆(H)) =⇒ (∆(G) →֒ ∆(H))
ii) (∆(G)⇒ ∆(H)) =⇒ (∆(G)⇛ ∆(H)) =⇒ (G⇒ H)
iii) (∆(G)→ ∆(H)) =⇒ (∆(G) →֒ ∆(H)) =⇒ (G 7→ H)
Proof.
i) The proof is obvious.
ii) Suppose (∆(G) ⇒ ∆(H)). It follows that ∆(Hi) ⊂ ∆(Gi) and for
each m ∈ ∆(Gi)\∆(Hi), there exists µ ∈ ∆(Hi) such that µ ≻∆(H) m.
According to Theorem 7, it follows that Hi ⊂ Gi for each i ∈ I and for
each m ∈ ∆(Gi)\∆(Hi), there exists µ ∈ ∆(Hi) such that µ ≻H m ⇐⇒
∆(G)⇛ ∆(H).
If m = δx with x ∈ Gi\Hi, we have that Hi ⊂ Gi for each i ∈ I and
for each x ∈ Gi\Hi, there exists µ ∈ ∆(Hi) such that µ ≻H x, which is
equivalent with G⇒ H.
iii) The implication are true from i) and ii).
Theorem 20. If G is a finite game, then (∆(G)⇛ ∆(H)) ⇐⇒ (G⇒ H).
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Proof. The direct implication ” =⇒ ” comes from Theorem 8, ii).
We prove ” ⇐= ”. Let x ∈ Gi\Hi. Since G⇒ H, there exists µx ∈ ∆(Hi)
such that µx ≻∆(H) x =⇒ µx ≻∆(H) δx.
Let m ∈ ∆(Gi)\∆(Hi). According to Theorem 5, m can be unique rep-
resented as a convex combination of Dirac measures δx, x ∈ Gi\Hi. Then,
there exists unique cx ∈ [0, 1],
∑
x∈Gi\Hi
cx = 1 such that m =
∑
x∈Gi\Hi
cxδx.
But, as we noted above, for each δx with x ∈ Gi\Hi, there exists µx ∈ ∆(Hi)
such that µx ≻H δx. Therefore, µ =
∑
x∈Gi\Hi
cxµx is a probability measure
on Gi\Hi and µx ≻H m.
Theorem 21. Let G⇒ H. If there exists x∗ ∈ Gi\Hi such that ui(x∗, s−i) ≥
ui(x, s−i) for each x ∈ Gi\Hi and s−i ∈ H−i, then ∆(G)⇛ ∆(H).
Proof. Let x∗ be such that x∗ ∈ Gi\Hi and ui(x∗, s−i) ≥ ui(x, s−i) for
each x ∈ Gi\Hi and s−i ∈ H−i. Then,
∫
Gi\Hi
ui(x, s−i)dm ≤ ui(x∗, s−i) for
each m ∈ ∆(Gi\Hi). (1)
Since x∗ ∈ Gi\Hi and G ⇒ H, it follows that there exists µ ∈ ∆(Hi)
such that µ ≻H x∗, that is
∫
Hi
ui(x, s−i)dµ > ui(x
∗, s−i) for each s−i ∈ H−i.
(2)
From 1) and 2), it follows that for m ∈ ∆(Gi)\∆(Hi), there exists µ ∈
∆(Hi) such that
∫
Hi
ui(x, s−i)dµ >
∫
Gi\Hi
ui(x, s−i)dm for each s−i ∈ H−i,
that is µ ≻H m. Therefore, µ ≻H m.
Corollary 22. Let G 7→ H. If there exists x∗ ∈ Gi\Hi such that ui(x∗, s−i) ≥
ui(x, s−i) for each x ∈ Gi\Hi and s−i ∈ H−i, then ∆(G) →֒ ∆(H).
4.3. Dufwenberg-Stegeman-like Lemma
We study first the case of the game reduction G 7→ H .
Lemma 23. In the case of a finite game, Lemma Dufwenberg-Stegeman re-
mains true for the game reduction G 7→ H.
Proof. If G 7→∗ H, then ∆(G) →֒∗ ∆(H), according to Theorem 9 and
Theorem 8. Let µ′ ≻H x for some x ∈ Gi and µ′ ∈ ∆(Gi). Then, µ′ ≻H δx.
By applying Lemma Dufwenberg-Stegeman to ∆(G) →֒∗ ∆(H), we obtain
that there exists µ∗ ∈ ∆(Hi) such that µ ≯H µ∗ ≻H δx for each µ ∈ ∆(Gi).
Therefore, there exists µ∗ ∈ ∆(Hi) such that µ ⊁H µ∗ ≻H x for each µ ∈
∆(Gi).
We also obtain the next result concerning the game reduction G 7→∗ H.
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Lemma 24. Let I be a finite set. For each i ∈ I, let Gi be a compact
subset of a metric space X considered with its borelian sets, Hi ⊂ Gi and
ui :
∏
i∈I Gi → R+ uppersemicontinuous in each argument. Let G 7→
∗ H and
suppose that ∆(G) →֒∗ ∆(H). If µ′ ≻H x for some x ∈ Gi and µ′ ∈ ∆(Gi),
i ∈ I, then there exists µ∗ ∈ ∆(Hi) such that µ ⊁H µ∗ ≻H x for each
µ ∈ ∆(Gi).
Proof. According to Theorem 6, if G is compact, ∆(G) is also compact.
According to Corollary 2, if ui(., s−i) is upper semicontinuous for each s−i ∈
G−i, then Vi(., s−i) is also upper semicontinuous on ∆(Gi) for each s−i ∈ G−i,
where Vi(µ, s−i) =
∫
Gi
ui(s, s−i)dµ.
Since G 7→∗ H, there exists a sequence of parings At, t = 0, 1, 2... such
that A0 = G, At 7→ At+1 ∀t ≥ 0 and Hi = ∩tAti, ∀i ∈ I. Let Z = {µ ∈
∆(Gi) : Vi(µ, s−i) ≥ Vi(µ′, s−i) for each s−i ∈ H−i}. Z is a nonempty set,
since µ′ ∈ Z. Z is also closed (as intersection of the closed sets Z(s−i) = {µ ∈
∆(Gi) : Vi(µ, s−i) ≥ Vi(µ′, s−i), s−i ∈ H−i}) and therefore compact. Let us
define f : Z → R, f(µ) = Vi(µ, s∗−i) for s
∗
−i ∈ H−i fixed. The function f
is uppersemicontinuous and it reaches its maximum on the compact set Z.
Denote by µ∗ = argmaxµ∈Z f(µ).
It follows that, there exists µ∗ ∈ ∆(Gi) such that µ ≯H µ∗ ≻H x for
each µ ∈ ∆(Gi). Therefore, µ ≯H µ∗ for each µ ∈ ∆(Gi) and then µ ≯At µ∗
for each µ ∈ ∆(Gi) and t ≥ 0. Since ∆(G) →֒∗ ∆(H), we conclude that
µ∗ ∈ ∆(At) for each t ≥ 0, and therefore, µ∗ ∈ ∆(Hi).
For H = G, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 25. Let I be a finite set. For each i ∈ I, let Gi be a compact sub-
set of a metric space X considered with its borelian sets and ui :
∏
i∈I Gi →
R+ upper semicontinuous in each argument. If µ
′ ≻G x for some x ∈ Gi and
µ′ ∈ ∆(Gi), i ∈ I, then there exists µ∗ ∈ ∆(Gi) such that µ ⊁G µ∗ ≻G x for
each µ ∈ ∆(Gi).
Corollary 26. Lemma 8 is true if, instead of having the assumption∆(G) →֒∗
∆(H), we have the following one: there exists x∗ ∈ Gi\Hi such that ui(x∗, s−i) ≥
ui(x, s−i) for each x ∈ Gi\Hi and s−i ∈ H−i.
Proof. The proof of the corollary comes from Theorem 6.
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4.4. Existence and uniqueness of maximal reductions
The main result of Section 4 is Theorem 11.
Theorem 27. Let G = (I, (Gi)i∈I , (ui)i∈I) be a strategic game such that I
is a finite set and for each i ∈ I, Gi is a nonempty compact subset of a
metric space, ui :
∏
i∈I Gi → R is upper semicontinuous in each argument
and for each G 7→ H, ∆(G) →֒ ∆(H) (or there exists x∗ ∈ Gi\Hi such that
ui(x
∗, s−i) ≥ ui(x, s−i) for each x ∈ Gi\Hi and s−i ∈ H−i). Then, G has a
unique nonempty maximal ( 7→∗) reduction M and M is nonempty, compact
and upper semicontinuous.
Proof. The game (I, (∆(Gi))i∈I , (Vi)i∈I) is also compact and own-upper-
semicontinuous. According to Lemma 8, we have that if µ′ ≻H x for some
x ∈ Gi and µ′ ∈ ∆(Gi), i ∈ I, then there exists µ∗ ∈ ∆(Hi) such that
µ ⊁H µ
∗ ≻H x for each µ ∈ ∆(Gi). The set ∆(Hi) is nonempty since Hi is
nonempty.
The proof of the uniqueness of M follows the same line as the proof of
Theorem 1a) of Dufwenberg-Stegeman.
Now we are proving that, if G is compact and own-upper semicontinuous
and G 7→ H fast, then H is compact and nonempty.
Choose i ∈ I such that Hi 6= Gi. Since µ >G x for some x ∈ Gi,
µ ∈ ∆(Gi), according to Corollary 4, we have that Hi 6= ∅. It remains to
show that Hi is compact. Choose µ ∈ ∆(Hi) and let Let Z(µ) = {(si, s−i) ∈
G : Vi(µ, s−i) ≤ ui(si, s−i)}, Zi(µ) =priZ(µ) and Z−i(µ) =pr−iZ(µ).
The set Zi(µ) is nonempty. In order to prove this fact, we will assume
the opposite: Zi(µ) = ∅. In this case, Vi(µ, s−i) > ui(s, s−i) for each s ∈ Gi
and for each s−i ∈ G−i, and it follows that µ >G s for each s ∈ Gi. We can
conclude that µ ≻H s for each s ∈ Gi, and, since G⇒ H fast, we have that
(for each s ∈ Gi ⇒ s /∈ Hi) and, then, Hi is an empty set, and we reached a
contradiction.
Now let us define Fi(µ, s−i) = {si ∈ Gi : Vi(µ, s−i) ≤ ui(si, s−i)} and
then, Zi(µ) = ∩s−i∈Z−i(µ)Fi(x, s−i).
Since ui(., s−i) is upper semicontinuous for each s−i ∈ G−i, we have that
Zi(µ) is closed as being an intersection of closed subsets. We will show that
Hi = ∩µ∈∆(Hi)Zi(µ).
Let us consider x ∈ Gi. For any µ ∈ ∆(Hi), if x /∈ Z(µ), we have that
Vi(µ, s−i) > ui(x, s−i) for each s−i ∈ G−i and, therefore µ >G x. Then x /∈ Hi
and Hi ⊆ ∩µ∈∆(Hi)Z(µ).
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If x /∈ Hi, then µ >G x for some µ ∈ ∆(Gi) and Lemma 8 implies that
there exists µ∗ ∈ ∆(Gi) such that µ∗ >G x and therefore, x /∈ Z(µ∗) and we
can conclude that x /∈ ∩µ∈∆(Hi)Z(µ). Therefore, Hi ⊇ ∩µ∈∆(Hi)Z(µ).
The equality Hi = ∩µ∈∆(Hi)Zi(µ) holds and, since Zi(µ) is closed for all
µ, Hi is also closed and therefore compact.
Let C (t) , t = 0, 1, ... denote the unique sequence of subgames of G such
that C(0) = G and C(t) 7→ C(t + 1) is fast for each t ≥ 0. We have that
C(t) is compact and nonempty for each t ≥ 0. It follows that Mi = ∩t∈C(t)i
is compact, nonempty for each i ∈ I.
We will show that M is a maximal ( 7→∗) reduction of G. Let x ∈ Mi,
µ ∈ ∆(Mi). Let X(t) = {s−i ∈ C(t)−i : Vi(µ, s−i) ≤ ui(x, s−i)}. If X(t) = ∅
for each t such that C(t) 6= M, then µ ≻C(t) x, contradiction. Therefore,
X(t) 6= ∅. The set C(t)−i is compact for each t such that C(t) 6= M. Then,
M−i 6= ∅ and it follows that the set X = {s−i ∈M−i : Vi(µ, s−i) ≤ ui(x, s−i)}
is nonempty. We conclude that µ ⊁M x.
5. Concluding remarks
We identified a class of discontinuous games for which the iterated elimi-
nation of strictly dominated strategies produce a unique maximal reduction
that is nonempty. We also provided conditions under which order indepen-
dence remains valid for the case that the pure strategies are dominated by
mixed strategies. Our results expel M. Dufwenberg and M. Stegeman’s idea
in [6] that ’the proper definition and the role of iterated strict dominance
is unclear for games that are not compact and continuous’. G. Tian and J.
Zhou’s notion of transfer upper continuity proved to be a suitable assump-
tion for the payoff functions of a game in order to obtain our results. Their
Weierstrass-like theorem for transfer weakly upper continuous functions de-
fined on a compact set was the key of the proofs of Lemma 3 and Lemma 4.
We can conclude and emphasize that, even outside the continuous class of
games, the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies remains an
interesting procedure.
We thank to Professor Krzysztof Apt for the precious ideas under which
this paper has been developed and for the hospitality he proved during our
postdoctoral stage at the Institute for Logic, Language and Computation
from the University of Amsterdam in the summer of 2012.
19
References
[1] K. Apt, The Many Faces of Rationalizability, The B.E. Journal of The-
oretical Economics, 7(1), (2007), Article 18, 38 pages.
[2] K. Apt, Order Independence and Rationalizability, Proc. of the 10th
conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK
X), pp. 22-38 (2005)
[3] B. D. Bernheim, Rationalizable strategic behavior, Econometrica (1984),
52, pp. 1007–1028.
[4] S. Y. Chang, Noncompact qualitative games with application to equilib-
ria. Nonlinear Analysis, 65 (2006), 593-600.
[5] Y.-C. Chen, N. V. Long, and X. Luo, Iterated strict dominance in general
games. Games and Economic Behavior 61 (2007), 219-315.
[6] [11] X.P. Ding, New H-KKM theorems and their applications to geo-
metric property, coincidence theorems, minimax inequality and maximal
elements, Indian J. Pure Appl. Math. 26 (1995) 1–19.
[7] X. P. Ding, Equilibria of noncompact generalized games with U-
majorized preference correspondences. Appl. Math. Lett., 11 (1998), 5,
115-119.
[8] M. Dufwenberg and M. Stegeman, Existence and uniqueness of maximal
reductions under iterated strict dominance, Econometrica (2002), 70, pp.
2007–2023.
[9] I. Gilboa, E. Kalai and E. Zemel, On the order of eliminating dominated
strategies, Operation Research Letters, 9 (1990), pp. 85–89.
[10] I. Gilboa, E. Kalai and E. Zemel, The complexity of eliminating dom-
inated strategies, Mathematics of Operation Research, 18 (1993), 553-
565.
[11] X. Liu, H. Cai,Maximal Elements and Equilibrium of Abstract Economy.
Appl. Math. Mech., 22 (2001), 10, 1225-1230.
[12] L. Marx and J. Swinkels, Order independence for iterated weak domi-
nance, Games and Economic Behavior, 18 (1997), 219-245.
20
[13] P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, Rationalizability, learning and equilibrium in
games with strategic complementarities. Econometrica, 58 (1996), 1255-
1278.
[14] J. F. Nash, Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci.
U. S. A., 36, (1950), 1, 48-49.
[15] M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, The MIT
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1994.
[16] D. G. Pearce, Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of per-
fection, Econometrica, 52 (1984), pp. 1029–1050.
[17] K. Ritzberger, Foundations of Non-cooperative Game Theory, Oxford
University Press, Oxford (2001).
[18] A. Rubinstein, Modelling Bounded Rationality, The MIT Press Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts London, England, 1998.
[19] X. Z. Yuan, The Study of Minimax inequalities and Applications to
Economies and Variational inequalities. Memoirs of the American Soci-
ety, 132 (1988).
[20] X. Z. Yuan, E. Tarafdar, Maximal elements and equilibria of general-
ized games for U-majorized and condensing correspondences. Internat.
J. Math. Sci., 1 (1996), 179-189.
21
